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The  commercial  banking  system  in  this  country 
has  undergone  an  unparalleled  consolidation  move- 
ment  since  the  mid-1960’s.  Bank  holding  companies 
(BHCs)  have  been  active  since  the  turn  of  the  cen- 
tury,  yet  they  have  become  an  important  force  in  the 
banking  structure  only  since  1965.  The  phenomenal 
growth  in  the  number  of  corporations  that  hold  stock 
in  one  or  more  banks  and  the  increased  concentration 
of  banking  resources  in  such  entities  have  prompted 
much  discussion  and  a  wealth  of  analytical  studies  of 
the  potential  impact  of  this  development  on  the  na- 
tion’s  financial  system.  Central  to  many  of  these 
studies  has  been  the  question  of  how  acquisition  by  a 
holding  company  may  affect  the  performance  of  an 
acquired  commercial  bank.  Related  to  this  issue,  and 
often  confused  with  it,  is  the  question  of  the  motiva- 
tion  for  such  acquisitions.  The  latter  question  has  yet 
to  be  adequately  answered. 
Most  efforts  to  explain  the  economic  basis  for  bank 
holding  company  acquisitions  have  evolved  from  a 
framework  designed  to  measure  the  resulting  impact 
on  the  community  served  by  an  acquired  bank. 
Attention  has  been  centered  on the  consistent  findings 
that  the  profitability  of a bank  has  not  been  improved, 
relative  to  similarly  situated  independent  banks, 
through  acquisition  to  an  extent  that  would  clearly 
justify  acquisition  by  a  wealth-maximizing  bank 
holding  company.  But  conclusions  based  on measure- 
ments  of  bank  profitability  alone  ignore  the  possi- 
bility  that  owners’  claims  on  earnings  streams  are 
altered  significantly  by  the  transaction. 
This  article  examines  the  hypothesis  that  the  in- 
centives  for  acquisition  lie  primarily  in  potential 
benefits  accruing  to  owners,  i.e.,  shareholders,  who 
have  claims  on  the  earnings  streams  of  the  two  firms 
involved.  The  framework  for  the  analysis  centers 
on  a  comparison  of  the  valuation  of  expected  future 
earnings  streams  for  both  sets  of  stockholders  under 
the  alternative  assumptions,  first,  that  the  acquisition 
is  not  consummated  and,  second,  that  it  is  consum- 
mated.  Rational  behavior  implies  that  owners  will 
exchange  claims  to  earnings  only  if  they  value  those 
received  more  than  those  released. 
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Some  Previous  Evidence  Among  efforts  to  estab- 
lish  the  existence  of  a  “valuation  disparity”  sufficient 
to  justify  a  BHC  acquisition  have  been  those  by 
Thomas  Piper  and  Steven  Weiss.1  In  a  study  of 
acquisitions  during  the  period  1947  through  1967, 
Piper  argued  that  the  economic  incentives  for  acqui- 
sitions  of  banks  “center  on  the  resultant  changes, 
both  in  the  cash  flows  and  earnings  of  the  acquired 
banks  and  in  the  valuation  of  these  cash  flows”  [3, 
p.  98].  He  emphasized  the  importance  of  comparing 
the  value  of  alternative  ownership  interests.  For  the 
acquisitions  studied,  Piper  compared  the  value  re- 
ceived  by  the  stockholders  of  the  bank  being  acquired 
with  the  value  they  relinquished  and  found  that  the 
value  of  the  claims  bank  stockholders  obtained  was 
significantly  greater  than  their  previously  held  claims 
on  the  bank.2  In  fact,  the  ratio  at  which  the  holding 
company  stock  was  exchanged  for  that  of  the  bank 
was  so  favorable  to  the  bank’s  shareholders  that  a 
careful  examination  of  possible  earnings  differentials 
between  the  firms  was  not  necessary.  The  market 
values  of  the  stocks  have  been  an  adequate  (albeit 
imperfect)  gauge  of  this  differential.  A  much  closer 
look,  however,  is  necessary  when  trying  to  explain 
why  BHCs  have  been  willing  to  pay  such  premiums. 
Piper’s  original  study  and  his  later  work  with 
Weiss  shifted  emphasis  from  the  valuation  of  the 
stocks  traded  in  the  acquisition  to  the  profitability  of 
acquisitions  to  the  stockholders  of  the  parent  holding 
company.  Each  study  concluded  that,  due  to the  high 
premiums  paid  for  bank  stock,  acquisitions  have 
failed  to  improve  the  earnings  of  the  holding  com- 
panies.  The  shift  from  valuation  to  profitability, 
however,  begs  questions  concerning  the  manner  in 
which  owners  value  a  given  income  stream. 
A  valuation  framework  that  includes  a  constant 
discount  rate,  adjusted  for  expectations  of  risk, 
rules  out  any  possibility  that  the  manner  in  which 
1 Piper’s  analysis  of  bank  acquisitions  [3]  and  his  subsequent  work 
with  Weiss  [4]  clearly  recognized  than  an  alteration  in  ownership 
positions  resulted  from  acquisitions.  Their  consideration  of  this 
point  was  an  important  shift  from  concentration  on  bank  perfor- 
mance  alone. 
2 Piper’s  results  showed  that  the  market  value  of  BHC  stock  received 
exceeded  the  book  value  of  the  bank  by  30%.  In  his  later  study  with 
Weiss,  comparing  the  claims  on  holding  company  earnings  received 
by  former  stockholders  of  the  acquired  bank  relative  to  earnings  of 
the  bank  stock,  the  median  premium  was  found  to  be  16%. 
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operating  policies  and  earnings  performance  of  the 
firm.  While  such  an  assumption  greatly  simplifies 
the  analysis,  it  ignores  a  potentially  important  source 
of  the  valuation  disparity  underlying  the  incentives 
for  the  acquisition  of  commercial  banks  by  BHCs: 
i.e.,  changes  in  owners’  discount  rates  due  to  their 
evaluation  of  risk.3 
Valuation  via  a  Risk-Adjusted  Discount  Rate 
The  most  widely  used  model  for  valuing  risky,  multi- 
period  earnings  streams  is  the  risk-adjusted  discount 
rate.  Through  this  technique,  a  measure  of  the 
magnitude  of  the  earnings  flow,  usually  expected 
value,  is  evaluated  by  a  discount  rate  that  takes  into 
account  the  rate  of  time  preference  and  some  measure 
of  the  degree  of  riskiness  associated  with  an  earnings 
flow.  Individuals  must  make  estimates  of  future 
earnings  and  apply  a subjectively  determined  discount 
rate  to  them. 
Since  this  approach  is  not  based  on  any  specific 
assumption  as  to  what  constitutes  the  risk  associated 
with  expected  earnings,  it  has  serious  shortcomings. 
Unless  a  specific,  dynamic  measure  of  risk  is  in- 
corporated  within  the  framework,  the  detection  of 
differences  in  valuation  due  to  differences  in  risk  is 
not  possible.  In  order  to  measure  the  effect  on  valu- 
ation  of  an  acquisition,  knowledge  of  the  pre-acquisi- 
tion  capitalization  rate  and  the  response  of  that  rate 
to  the  acquisition  is  required.  It  is  entirely  possible 
that  the  addition  of  another  income  stream  with  a 
different  discount  rate  may  alter  owners’  capitali- 
zation  rates  in  subsequent  periods. 
A  specific  present  value  of  earnings  cannot, 
however,  be  derived  without  information  concerning 
owners’  attitudes  toward  risk  and  the  trade-off  they 
are  willing  to  make  between  risk  and  return.  This 
becomes  a  serious  stumbling  block  in  the  search  for 
the  motivation  for  acquisition,  but  it  need  not  be  in- 
surmountable.  There  are  two  distinct  sets  of  in- 
vestors  involved  in  any  acquisition:  the  independent 
bank  shareholders  and  those  of  the  BHC.  Each 
group  obtains  a  claim  on  an  earnings  stream  that  is 
somewhat  altered  from  its  previous  holdings.  The 
acquisition  is  beneficial  if  the  capitalized  value  of  the 
transformed  earnings  stream  is  greater  than  that  the 
stockholders  perceive  would  have  been  available 
through  holding  on  to  their  existing  claims.  A 
change  in  this  valuation  through  a  shift  in  capitali- 
zation  rates,  then,  could  result  from  either  a  shift  in 
value, profit, and the owners'  capitalization  rate 
(which is adjusted  for considerations  of time prefer- 
ence and risk). 
3 If  owners  are  concerned  with  more  than  just  the  mean  level  of 
earnings,  and  a  measure  of  risk  does  affect  their  discount  factor(s), 
a  reduction  in  the  risk  associated  with  a  given  earnings  distribution 
will  reduce  the  discount  factor  if  owners  are  risk  averse  and  result 
in  a  higher  valuation  of  those  earnings.  Comparison  of  earnings 
means  alone  will  not  detect  this  disparity. 
the  investors’  measure  of  risk  following  the  acquisi- 
tion  or  the  manner  in  which  a  given  change  in  risk 
affects  the  capitalization  rate.  Since  the  individuals 
making  the  valuation  comparisons  have  not  changed, 
it  seems  reasonable  to  assume,  for  simplicity,  that 
the  exact  form  of  the  capitalization  rate  function  in 
terms  of  risk  does  not  change.4  As  long  as  an  in- 
crease  (decrease)  in  the  measure  of  risk  faced  by 
owners  is  reflected  in  an  increase  (decrease)  in  the 
discount  factor  used  to  evaluate  an  earnings  stream, 
emphasis  may  be  placed  on  the  expected  behavior  of 
risk  under  alternative  situations.  If  it  is  assumed 
that  a  detected  difference  in  the  measure  of  risk 
results  in  different  capitalization  rates,  valuation  dis- 
parities  may  be  sought  by  comparing  alternative 
earnings  performances  and  measures  of  risk. 
The  Basis  for  Acquisition  The  suggested  ap- 
proach  for  analysis  of  the  economic  basis  for  acqui- 
sition  is  founded  upon  the  premise  that  the  firm  that 
engages  in  banking  determines  its  operating  and  or- 
ganizational  structure  on  the  basis  of  optimization  of 
the  economic  value  of  the  ownership  of  the  firm, 
i.e.,  the  owners’  wealth  position.  Owners’  wealth  is 
perceived  as  the  capitalized  value  of  the  expected 
future  earnings  stream.  Since  the  objective  to  be 
maximized  is  in  value  terms,  specific  attention  must 
be  given  to  its  components.  In  general  terms, 
The  essential  consideration  of  the  analysis  for  bank 
owners  is  the  difference  in  the  valuation  of  their 
ownership  position  if  they  (a)  continue  their  present 
structure  of  organization  and  production  as  opposed 
to  (b)  trading  their  bank  stock  for  partial  interest 
in  a  holding  company.  For  BHC  owners,  it  is  the 
difference  in  the  valuation  of  their  ownership  claims 
perceived  through  (a)  the  present  BHC  structure 
and  (b)  the  expanded  organization  created  through 
acquisition.  The  first  disparity  provides  an  incentive 
for  the  present  bank  owners  to  make  the  transaction, 
while  the  second  provides  the  incentive  for  holding 
company  acquisition  activity.  The  purchase  price  of 
the  bank  stock,  usually  in  terms  of  a  stock-exchange 
ratio,  is  then  determined  by  the  relative  bargaining 
power  of  the  buyer  and  sellers  and  the  degree  of 
competition  in  the  buying  and  selling  of  bank  equity. 
4 For  a  discussion  of  the  dependence  of  the  form  of  an  individual’s 
capitalization  rate  function  in  the  presence  of  uncertainty  on  the 
form  of  his  underlying  utility  function,  see  Douglas  Vickers, 
Chapters  2  and  4.  Vickers  suggests  that  the  capitalization  rate 
function  is  nonlinear  in  the  coefficient  of  variation  of  net  income 
and  concave  upward. 
10  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1975 Regardless  of  the  measure  of  risk  utilized,  accep- 
tance  of  the  proposition  that  owners’  conceptions  of 
risk  may  change  over  time  and  may  be  altered  by 
specific  actions  of  the  firm  has  important  implications 
for  the  risk-adjusted  discount  rate  and  may  signifi- 
cantly  alter  valuation  of  the  earnings  accruing  to 
owners.  The  provision  of  a  dynamic  capitalization 
rate  (p),  which  is  a  function  of  the  risk  associated 
with  a  given  earnings  stream,  provides  a  valuation 
framework  that  considers  both  the  earnings  experi- 
ence  and  the  behavior  of  the  discounting  function 
used  by  owners  in  evaluating  their  ownership  posi- 
tion.  In  present  value  terms, 
where  V  is  the  present  value  of  the  future  earnings 
equity  in  period  t,  pt  is  the  owners’  capitalization 
rate5  applied  to  earnings  in  period  t,  and  H  is  the 
economic  horizon  of  ownership  in  the  firm.  In  this 
framework,  valuation  disparities  may  be  sought  for 
both  sets  of  participants  in  the  transaction-the  bank 
stockholder  and  the  shareholder  of  the  BHC. 
Bank  owners  will  have  an  incentive  to  trade  their 
stock  only  if  a  valuation  disparity  is  established  be- 
tween  the  capitalized  value  of  the  stream  of  bank 
profits  accruing  to  owners  through  continued  owner- 
ship  in  the  bank  and  that  realizable  from  gaining  an 
ownership  interest  in  the  holding  company.  Specifi- 
cally,  they  have  an  incentive  to  trade  their  stock  for 
that  of  a  holding  company  only  if: 
where  VB  is  the  ownership  valuation  of  the  bank, 
company  obtainable  by  bank  owners,  and  VHC is  the 
total  ownership  valuation  of  the  BHC.  The  bank 
owners’  valuation  of their  portion  of holding  company 
earnings  will,  in  this  case,  be  greater  than  their 
valuation  of  expected  bank  earnings.  Previous  find- 
been  large  enough  to  assure  the  necessary  disparity 
in  valuation  of  earnings. 
5 The  owners’  discount  rata  in  period  t  (pt)  may  be  further  speci- 
fied:  pt =  (1+r1)  (1+r2)  .  .  .  (1+rt-1)  (1+rt),  where  rt  is 
dependent  on  the  owners’  time  preference  pattern  i  (assumed  con- 
stant)  and  an  appropriate  measure  of  risk,  e.g.,  the  coefficient  of 
variation  of  net  income  (Vn),  which  is  the  standard  deviation  of 
the  probability  distribution  of  expected  net  incomes  divided  by  the 
mean  of  the  probability  distribution  function.  p,  then,  may  also  be 
expressed  as  functionally  dependent  on  these  same  variables: 
Similarly,  an  incentive  for  holding  company  acqui- 
sitions  exists  on  the  demand  side  for  bank  stock  only 
if  present  company  stockholders  view  a  similar  valu- 
ation  disparity.  In  particular,  only  if  the  acquisition 
of  a  commercial  bank  improves  the  capitalized  value 
of  owners’  earnings  over  that  perceived  without  ac- 
quisition  will  present  owners  move  to  acquire  the 
bank  ; i.e.,  only  if: 
where  (VHC) ~B  is  the  ownership  valuation  of  the 
holding  company  without  acquiring  the  bank, ß  is 
the  proportion  of  ownership  interest  in  the  company 
is  the  capitalized  value  of  the  earnings  stream  of  the 
holding  company  including  the  proposed  acquired 
bank.  Even  though  their  percentage  ownership  (ß) 
falls  with  an  acquisition,  present  owners  may  still 
benefit  if  earnings  increase  significantly  or  if  risk, 
and,  therefore,  the  vector  of  owners’  capitalization 
rates  following  acquisition  is  reduced. 
For  an  acquisition  to  occur,  then,  both  valuation 
disparities  must  exist.  The  present  owners  of  an 
independent  bank  and  of  a  holding  company  will 
agree  to  participate  in  an  exchange  of  stock  if  each 
group  perceives  a  positive  shift  in  its  ownership  valu- 
ation  resulting  from  the  transaction.  Equations  (2) 
and  (3)  represent  the  conditions  necessary  for  con- 
summation  of  an  acquisition  agreement.  Of  particu- 
lar  interest  is  the  fact  that  nowhere  in  (3)  is  there 
any  implication  that  the  bank’s  profitability  must  be 
increased  following  acquisition.  If  the  owners  are 
assumed  to  maximize  the  value  of  their  ownership 
position,  they  will  be  concerned  with  the  valuation  of 
their  share  of  the  holding  company  rather  than  that 
of a  single  subsidiary.  It  may  be  that  factors  such  as 
the  structure  of  organization,  production  consider- 
ations,  and  costs  that  optimize  the  economic  valuation 
of  the  consolidated  company’s  earnings  stream  con- 
flict  with  the  attainment  of  the  maximization  of  one 
of  its  subsidiaries’  returns.  Such  an  hypothesis  is 
consistent  with  empirical  results  heretofore  obtained 
that  suggest  that  bank  profitability  is  not  significantly 
enhanced  through  holding  company  affiliation. 
In  fact,  if  it  is  recognized  that  the  acquisition  of  a 
bank  may  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  level  and/or 
stability  of  earnings  of  other  subsidiaries  within  a 
BHC  organization,  consideration  of  changes  in  bank 
profitability  is  an  inadequate  tool  with  which  to  ex- 
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tial  that  the  analysis  consider  both  the  earnings  ex- 
perience  and  associated  expectations  of  risk  of  each 
ownership  position.  An  examination  of both  levels  of 
alternative  earnings  and  the  manner  in  which  those 
earnings  are  valued  is  necessary  before  conclusions 
may  be  reached. 
Empirical  Investigation  The  argument  presented 
to  this  point  suggests  that  a  valuation  framework,  by 
taking  expectations  of  future  earnings  and  a  measure 
of  risk  associated  with  the  pattern  of  future  earnings 
into  account,  can  explain  the  economic  motivation  of 
both  independent  bank  owners  and  BHC  sharehold- 
ers  to  negotiate  an  acquisition.  The  remainder  of 
this  article  investigates  the  gains  accruing  to  holding 
company  shareholders  through  acquisition. 
A  BHC’s  acquisition  of a commercial  bank  involves 
the  dilution  of  its  present  ownership  in  an  attempt 
to  increase  the  present  value  of  the  ownership  re- 
tained.  This  result  is  assured  if  the  original  BHC 
owners  believe  that  following  the  acquisition  their 
earnings  will  be  greater,  with  equivalent  or  reduced 
risk,  than  they  would  be  without  acquisition.  This 
result  could  also  occur,  however,  through  a  reduction 
in  owners’  risk  with  equivalent  or  improved  future 
earnings.  Any  motivation  for  acquisition  arising  from 
the  combination  of  reduced  earnings  and  reduced 
risk  or  increased  earnings  and  increased  risk  follow- 
ing  acquisition  is  entirely  dependent  on  trade-offs 
between  risk  and  return  within  individual  preference 
functions.  Since  such  information  is  not  known,  sub- 
stantiation  of  our  hypothesis  must  rest  on  those 
cases  where  movements  in  risk  and  return  do  not 
have  conflicting  effects  on  valuation. 
The  tendency  in  recent  experience  for  multi-bank: 
holding  companies  to  acquire  numerous  commercial 
banks,  and  at  relatively  short  intervals,  seriously 
complicates  the  empirical  task  of  isolating  the  impact 
of  individual  bank  acquisitions  on  BHC  earnings 
performance.  The  only  feasible  empirical  test  has  to 
involve  the  entire  acquisition  program  of  the  holding 
company  and  concerns  itself  with  whether  or  not 
the  policy  of  expansion  through  acquisition  improves 
the  value  of  earnings  accruing  to  owners. 
Benefits  of  acquisition  may  be  explored  by  a  direct 
comparison  of  the  trends  in  the  earnings  experienced 
Table  I 
EARNINGS  PERFORMANCES  THROUGH  BHC  AND  CONTINUED  OWNERSHIP 
IN  LEAD  BANK  FOLLOWING  REORGANIZATION  AND  ACQUISITION 
*Significant  at  the  .20  level. 
Note:  Standard  deviations  in  parentheses. 
Sources:  Moody’s  Bank  and  Finance  Manual  and  internal  records  of  seven  Federal  Reserve  Banks. 
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ownership  positions.  The  appropriate  comparison 
involves  the  values  of  earnings  accruing  to  those 
owners  holding  stock  in  a  BHC  at  the  time  of  acqui- 
sition-for  they  are  the  individuals  contemplating  the 
transaction.  A  major  problem  with  this  approach  is 
that  data  that  would  reveal  the  earnings  of  a  holding 
company  had  the  acquisition  not  taken  place  are  not 
available. 
Fortunately,  however,  this  technique  is  applicable 
to  one  group  of  acquisitions  within  the  last  decade. 
Many  of  the  acquisitions  in  the  late  1960’s  were  fa- 
cilitated  by  the  simple  reorganization  of  an  indepen- 
dent  bank  into  another  corporate  form  that  was  per- 
mitted  to  acquire  additional  banks.  This  was  espe- 
cially  prevalent  in  states  where  mergers  and/or 
branching  were  prohibited  or  limited  by  state  law. 
The  corporate  transformation  often  involved  nothing 
more  than  the  exchange  of  new  BHC  stock  for  the 
stock  of  an  existing  bank.  At  the  same  time,  addi- 
tional  BHC  shares  were  issued  in  exchange  for  the 
stock  of  one  or  more  additional  banks.  In  other 
words,  the  lead  bank  owners  frequently  traded  100% 
ownership  in  the  bank  for  less  than  total  ownership  in 
an  expanded  banking  organization.  Comparison  of 
the  earnings  trend  of  that  specific  set  of  owners  fol- 
lowing  reorganization  with  what  they  would  have 
realized  had  they  retained  their  independent  owner- 
ship  in  the  bank  provides  a  measure  of  the  potential 
benefits  to  owners  via  acquisition  through  a  BHC 
organization. 
Such  a comparison  is  possible  making  use  of previ- 
ous  empirical  results  that  have  shown  commercial 
bank  profitability  to be  relatively  unaffected  by  acqui- 
sition.  This  comparison  was  chosen  because  it  pro- 
vides  the  only  appropriate  data  available  that  examine 
the  incentives  for  acquisition.  Reports  of  Income 
exist  for  the  years  following  acquisition  for  the  hold- 
ing  company  on  a consolidated  basis  and  for  the  lead 
bank  separately.  These  provide  the  basis  for  the 
direct  comparisons  of  owners’  valuation.  There  are 
no  comparable  data  available  that  reveal  the  earnings 
performance  of  a  multi-bank  holding  company  ex- 
cluding  any  particular  acquired  bank.  Benefits  ac- 
cruing  to  original  owners  of  these  lead  banks  through 
reorganization  and  acquisition,  then,  may  be  used  as  a 
subsample  to  shed  light  on  the  economic  incentives 
present  in  the  larger  population  of  BHC  acquisitions. 
If  bank  earnings  are  not  affected  by  acquisition,  the 
appropriate  comparison  to  be  made  is  between  the 
trends  of  the  ownership  valuations  of  (a)  the  original 
bank  owners’  equity  interest  in  the  bank  and  (b)  the 
6 The  reader  is  referred  to  Fischer,  Lawrence,  Piper,  Talley.  and 
Ware  for  a  good  sample  of  this  literature. 
Table  II 
COEFFICIENTS  OF  VARIATION  OF  GROWTH  RATES 
OF  NET  INCOME  THROUGH  BHC  AND  LEAD  BANK 
FOLLOWING  ACQUISITION 
*Significant  at  the  .05  level. 
Note:  Standard  deviations  in  parentheses. 
Sources:  See  table I. 
interest  obtained  by  that  same  group  of  owners  in 
the  expanded  BHC  organization  through  an  ex- 
change  of  stock. 
This  comparison,  requiring  complete  knowledge  of 
stock  splits,  dividends,  and  dilution  of  owners’  per- 
centage  share  of  total  earnings,  began  the  year  im- 
mediately  preceding  the  acquisition  and  continued  for 
at  least  five  years  after  the  time  of  acquisition.7  The 
sample  was  restricted  to  those  reorganizations  oc- 
curring  between  1962  and  1969,  with  all  but  three 
occurring  since  1966.  The  average  levels  of  earnings, 
average  growth  rates  in  earnings,  and  coefficients  of 
variation  of  levels  and  growth  rates  of  earnings  (as 
measures  of  owners’  risk)  were  computed  over  the 
period  for  both  of  the  ownership  alternatives.  These 
sample  data  permit  mean  difference  tests  to  be  per- 
formed  on  the  arguments  of  the  valuation  function. 
7 The  sample  consisted  of  18  BHCs  and  associated  lead  banks  located 
in  seven  Federal  Reserve  Districts  with  data  available  for  at  least 
five  years  after  reorganization.  The  lead  banks,  all  members  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  System,  ranged  in  deposit  size  from  approximately 
$100  million  to  $650  million  at  the  time  of  reorganization.  The 
necessary  information  was  available  for  the  sixth  year  for  seven  of 
these  holding  companies  and  banks  and  was  incorporated  into  the 
analysis.  Earnings  accruing  to  original  owners  were  computed  by 
multiplying  total  net  income  of  the  firm  by  their  percentage  owner- 
ship  in  the  firm  for  each  year. 
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*Significant  at  the  .10  level. 
**Significant  at  the  .05  level. 
Notes:  Standard  deviations  in  parentheses. 
Sixth  year  data  based  on  seven  BHCs  and  associated  lead  banks.  Other  years  based  on  sample  size  of  18. 
Sources:  See  Table  I. 
Table  I  shows  that  the  mean  difference  in  average 
annual  earnings  over  the  entire  post-acquisition  peri- 
od  was  substantial.  Previous  owners  of  the  lead 
banks  realized  an  average  improvement  of  $330,978 
per  year  through  the  reorganization.  This  sum  was 
not  statistically  significant,  however,  due  largely  to 
the  considerable  variance  within  sizes  of  firms  in- 
cluded  in  the  sample.  The  growth  rates  in net  income 
did  display  a  significant  difference,  though  only  at 
the  .20  level.  Specifically,  the  growth  rate  in  earn- 
ings  through  the  BHC  was  an  average  of  3.45% 
greater  per  year  than  would  have  been  the  case  had 
the  owners  maintained  their  interest  in  the  bank 
alone.  Growth  rates  may  be  especially  revealing 
since  they,  at  least  partially,  compensate  for  size 
discrepancies  within  the  sample.  At  the  same  time 
there  was  no  significant  difference  between  coeffi- 
cients  of  variation  of  net  income  over  the  entire 
period.  The  coefficients  of  variation  of  growth  rates 
of  income,  however,  exhibited  a  significant  difference 
at  the  .05  level  over  the  interval.  Specifically,  this 
measure  of  risk  was  substantially  reduced  through 
the  acquisition  program,  as  reflected  in  Table  II. 
A  comparison  of  earnings  experience  over  time, 
shown  in  Table  III,  indicates  that  holding  company 
owners  actually  experienced  reduced  earnings 
through  reorganization  and  acquisition  in  the  first 
year  relative  to  the  experience  of  the  bank  alone. 
This  first-year  reduction  in  earnings  appears  attrib- 
utable  to  the  large  premiums  paid  for  bank  stock. 
Each  year  thereafter,  however,  earnings  are  progres- 
sively  larger  under  the  BHC  structure.  This  trend 
is  also  reflected  in  the  difference  in  growth  rates  of 
earnings.8  In  general,  therefore,  it  appears  that 
earnings  for  the  BHC  not  only  increased  faster  on 
an  absolute  basis  when  compared  to  the  bank  but 
also  on  a  percentage  basis,  indicating  that  the  differ- 
ence  between  the  two  increases  over  time. 
If  owners  are  aware  of  this  trend,  they  may  will- 
ingly  accept  losses  in  the  first  year  after  acquisition 
in  order  to  receive  claims  on  increasingly  improved 
earnings  in  later  years.  If  primary  interest  is  placed 
on  later  years  by  omitting  the  first  year’s  results 
from  the  analysis,  the  inference  is  altered  somewhat. 
The  average  annual  difference  in net  income  increases 
to  $444,784,  while  the  difference  in  coefficients  of 
variation  of  net  income  remains  slightly  negative. 
These  differences  are  still  not  significant,  however. 
The  difference  in  average  income  growth  rates  in- 
creases  to  5.27%,  significant  now  at  the  .10  level, 
while  the  difference  in  coefficients  of  variation  of 
income  growth  rates  widened,  i.e.,  became  more  neg- 
ative.  This  difference  remained  significant  at  the 
.05  level. 
Summary  and  Conclusions  Trends  are  estab- 
lished  within  the  first  few  years  following  acquisition, 
therefore,  that  improve  the  present  value  of  earnings 
flowing  to  owners  relative  to  that  attainable  without 
8 If  BHC  earnings  are  depressed  in  the  immediate  post-acquisition 
period,  the  experience  of  the  third  and  fourth  years  following  re- 
organization  are  not  surprising.  since  most  of  the  BHCs  in  the 
sample  made  additional  acquisitions  in  those  years. 
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ments  in  the  level  of  earnings  to  which  they  hold 
claims  and,  apparently,  this  improvement  grows  over 
time.  In  addition,  to  the  extent  that  the  owners’ 
conception  of  risk  is  accurately  measured  by  the 
coefficient  of  variation  of  income  growth  rates,  risk 
is  reduced  through  the  acquisition  program.  If, 
as  assumed,  this  is  reflected  in  lower  capitalization 
rates  associated  with  the  expanded  banking  organiza- 
tion,  a  basis  for  disparity  in  both  the  numerator  and 
is  present. 
These  results  become  even  more  meaningful  when 
it  is  realized  that  earnings  streams  attained  through 
a  BHC  structure  may  be  somewhat  depressed  by 
subsequent  acquisitions  during  the  period  of  analysis. 
This  tendency  would  decrease  the  difference  in  earn- 
ings  performance  when  comparisons  are  made  over  a 
short  post-acquisition  interval  and  with  firms  that 
acquired  other  institutions  after  the  time  of  the  orig- 
inal  acquisition. 
A  note  of  caution  should  be  injected,  however. 
The  sample  used  represents  a  special  class  and  a 
very  small  proportion  of  the  total  population  of  ac- 
quisitions  taking  place.  Whether  or  not  measuring 
benefits  to  lead  bank  owners  who  formed  holding 
companies  to  acquire  other  firms  is  representative  of 
the  benefits  accruing  to  stockholders  of  established 
BHCs  through  acquisition  may  be  questioned.  It 
does,  however,  provide  a  rational  explanation  for  the 
formation  of  many  BHCs  that  is  consistent  with  the 
theory  of  wealth  maximization. 
REFERENCES 
1.  Fischer,  Gerald  C.  Bank  Holding  Companies.  New 
York:  Columbia  University  Press,  1961. 
2.  Lawrence,  Robert  J.  The  Performance  of  Bank 
Holding  Companies.  Washington:  Board  of  Gover- 
nors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  1967. 
3.  Piper,  Thomas  R.  The  Economics  of  Bank  Acquisi- 
tions  by  Registered  Bank  Holding  Companies.  Re- 
search  Report  No.  48.  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Boston,  March  1971. 
4.  Piper,  Thomas  R.  and  Steven  J.  Weiss.  “The  Profit- 
ability  of  Bank  Acquisitions  by  Multi-Bank  Holding 
Companies,”  New  England  Economic  Review,  Fed- 
eral  Reserve  Bank  of  Boston,  Sept.-Oct.  1971,  pp. 
2-12. 
5.  Talley,  Samuel  H.  The  Effect  of  Holding  Company 
Acquisitions  on  Bank  Performance.  Staff  Economic 
Study  No.  69.  Washington:  Board  of  Governors  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  System,  1971. 
6.  Vickers,  Douglas.  The  Theory  of  the  Firm:  Produc- 
tion,  Capital,  and  Finance.  New  York:  McGraw 
Hill,  Inc.,  1968. 
7.  Ware,  Robert  F.  “Performance  of  Banks  Acquired 
by  Multi-Bank  Holding  Companies  in  Ohio,”  Eco- 
nomic  Review,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Cleveland, 
March-April  1973,  pp.  19-28. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  15 